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Miranda v. Arizona - Supreme Court Ruling
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA No. 759. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 384 U.S. 436: 16 L. Ed. 2d. 694: 86 S. Ct. 1602: 10 Ohio Misc. 9: 36 io Op. 2d 237: 10A.L.R. 3d 974 Argued February 28 - March 1, 1966. June 13, 1966 *, Decided * Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York and No. 761, Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966; and No. 584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued February 28-March 2, 1966. SYLLABUS: In each of these cases the defendant while in police custody was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted and all convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal. Held: 1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Admendment's privlege against self-incrimination. Pp. 444-491. (a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion ingerent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. Pp. 445-458. (b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a period of custodiial interrogation as well as in the ccourts or during the course of other official investigations. Pp. 458-465. (c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, stressed the need for protective devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. Pp. 465-466. (d) In the absence of other effective measures the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privlege must be observed: The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Pp. 467-473. (e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease: if he states that he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Pp. 473-474. (f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Pp. 475 (g) Where the individual answers some questions during incustody interrogation he has not waived his privilege and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter. Pp. 475-476. (h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant. Pp. 476-477. 2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions. Pp. 479-491. 3. In each of these cases the statements were obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privlege against self-incrimination. Pp. 491-499. APPEAL-STATEMENT: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA., 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P. 2d 721; 15 N.Y. 2d 970, 207 N.E. 2d 527; 16 N.Y. 2d 614, 209 N.E. 2d 110; 342 F. 2d 684, reversed; 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P. 2d 97, affirmed. COUNSEL: John J. Flyn argued the cause for petitioner in No. 759. With him on the brief was John P. Frank. Victor M. Earle III argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 760. F. Conger Fawcett argued the cause and filed brief for petitioner in No. 761. Gordon Ringer, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 584. With him on the briefs were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and William E. James, Assistant Attorney General. Gary K. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent in No. 759. With him on the brief was Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General. William I. Siegel argued the cause for respondent in No. 760. With him on the brief was Aaron E. Koota. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for the United States in No. 761. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Ralph S. Sparitzer, Nathan Lewin, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer. William A., Norris, by appointment of the Court, 382 U.S. 952, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 584. Telford Taylor, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, in all cases. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Mahoney and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States and jurisdictions as follows: Richmond M. Flowers of Alabama, Darrell F. Smith of Arizona, Bruce Bennett of Arkansas, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, David P. Buckson of Deleware, Earl Faircloth of Florida, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, Allan G. Shepard of Idaho, William G. ark of Illinois, Robert C. Londerholm of Kansas, Robert Matthews of Kentucky, Jack P.F. Gremillian of Lousiana, Richard J. Dubord of Maine, Thomas Finan of Maryland, Norman H. Anderson of Missouri, Forrest H. Anderson of Montana, Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, T. Wade Bruton of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Robert Y. Thorton of Oregon, Walter E. Alessandroni of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLead of South Carolina, Waggoner Carr of Texas, Robert Y. Button of VIrginia, John J. O'Connell of Washington, C. Donald Robertson of West Virginia, John F. Raper of Wyoming, Rafael Hernandez of Colon of Puerto Rico and Francisco Corneiro of the Virgin Islands. Duane R. Nedrud, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the National District Attorneys Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 759 and 760, and reversal in No. 584. With him on the brief was Marguerte D. Oberto. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Paul J. Mishkin, Raymond L. Bradley, Peter Hearn and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, in all cases. OPINION BY: WARREN OPINION: MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. We delt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right ot remain silent or of his right ot consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statement thus made were constitutionally inadmissable. This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions N1. A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings n2. Police and prosecutor have speculated on its range and desirability n3. We granted certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925,9376, in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies an courts to follow. n1 Compare United States v. Chidress, 347 F. 2d 448 (CA 7th Cir. 1965), with Collins v. Beto, 348F. 2d 823 (CA 5th Cir. 1965) Compare People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338,398 P. 2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr 169 (1964) with People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E. (1964). n2 See, e.g., Enker & Elsen, Cousel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47 (1964); Herman, The Supreme COurt and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 449 (1964); Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal Justice in Our Time 1 (1965); Dowling, Escobedo J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 143, 156 (1965). The complex problems also prompted discussions by jurists. Compare Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev 13 (1964), with Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calf. L. Rev. 929 (1965). n3 For example, the Los Angeles Police Chief stated that "If the police are required...to...establish that the defendant was apprised of his constitutional guarantees of silence and legal counsel prior to the uttering of any admission or confession, and that he intelligently waived these guarantees... a whole Pandora's box is opened as to under what circumstances... can a defendant intelligently waive these rights... Allegations that modern criminal investigation can compensate for the lack of a confession or admission in every criminal case is totally absurd!" Parker, 40 L.A. Bar Bull. 603, 607, 642 (1965). His prosecurtorial counterpart, District Attorney Younger, stated that "It begins to appear that many of these seemingly restrictive decisions are going to contribute directly to a more effective, efficient and professional level of law enforcement.: L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1965, p.1. The former Police Commissioner of New York, Michael J. Murphy, stated of Escobedo: "What the Court is doing is akin to requiring one boxer to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules whil permitting the other to butt, gouge and bite." N.Y. Times, May 14, 1965, Pp. 39. the former United States Attourney for the District of Columbia, David C. Aacheson, who is presently Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (for Enforcement), and directly in charge of the Secret Service and the Bureau of Narcotics, observed that "Prosecution procedure has, at most, only the most remote causal connection with crime. Changes in court decisions and prosecution procedure would have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would procedure would have on a tumor of the brain." Quoted in Herman, supra, n.2, at 500, n. 270. Other views on the subject in general asre collected in Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 21 (1961). We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication off basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution - that "No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused shall..have the Assistance of Counsel" - rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821.) Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated: "The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquistorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, Made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-597 (1896).
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